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BLD-103        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-2394 
___________ 
 
GAESON LEE MURRAY, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN FAIRTON FCI 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-17-cv-03585) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 25, 2018 
 
Before:  RESTREPO, BIBAS and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 30, 2018 ) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pro se appellant Gaeson Murray, a federal prisoner currently confined in FCI-
Fairton, appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey dismissing for lack of jurisdiction his petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241.  For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 In 2005, Murray was convicted by a jury in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Virginia of one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with 
intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 
(b)(1)(A) and 846, and three counts of possession with intent to distribute and distribution 
of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).  See United States 
v. Glascoe, W.D. Va. No. 04-cr-30016-008.  Prior to trial, the Government filed an 
information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, notifying Murray that, because his 2001 felony 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance in Fauquier County, Virginia 
constituted a “felony drug offense,” he was subject to a mandatory minimum term of 20 
years in prison.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).  In light of that conviction, Murray was 
sentenced to the mandatory minimum term of 20 years in prison.  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed his judgment of conviction and sentence 
on appeal.  See United States v. Murray, 217 F. App’x 277, 277 (4th Cir. 2007) (per 
curiam).   
In 2008, Murray filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  He argued, inter 
alia, that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the notice of enhanced 
sentence under § 851 and that his mandatory minimum sentence was a violation of due 
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process.  The District Court denied the motion on the merits after an evidentiary hearing, 
and the Fourth Circuit declined to issue a certificate of appealability.  See United States 
v. Murray, 333 F. App’x 714 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).  In the Fourth Circuit, Murray 
has sought, and been denied, permission to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. 
 Murray then filed the § 2241 habeas petition at issue here while incarcerated 
within this Circuit.  He argued therein that he is actually innocent of his enhanced 
sentence under Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), because the question of 
whether his Virginia conviction constituted a “felony drug offense” was never presented 
to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt, and that he is actually innocent of his 
enhanced sentence also under Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), United 
States v. Hinkle, 832 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2016), and Holt v. United States, 843 F.3d 720 
(7th Cir. 2016), because those cases support the proposition that the Virginia statute 
under which he was convicted is no longer a “felony drug offense.”  Murray argued that 
he should, therefore, be resentenced without the enhancement.  The District Court 
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.  Murray appeals. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we 
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and review its factual 
findings for clear error.  See Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (per curiam).  
“Motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive means by which 
federal prisoners can challenge their convictions or sentences[.]”  Okereke v. United 
States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002).  As we have explained, “under the explicit 
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terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, unless a § 2255 motion would be ‘inadequate or ineffective,’ 
a habeas corpus petition under § 2241 cannot be entertained by the court.”  Cradle, 290 
F.3d at 538 (quoting § 2255(e)).  “A § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective only 
where the petitioner demonstrates that some limitation of scope or procedure would 
prevent a § 2255 proceeding from affording him a full hearing and adjudication of his 
wrongful detention claim.”  Id. at 538.  This exception is narrow and applies in only rare 
circumstances.  See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251-52 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Bruce 
v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 180 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 We agree with the District Court’s disposition of this case.  We have previously 
held that a §2255 motion is not an inadequate or ineffective vehicle for raising claims 
based on Alleyne.  Gardner v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 845 F.3d 99, 100 (3d Cir. 2017).  
Accordingly, Murray cannot resort to § 2241 to raise this claim. 
 In his second claim, Murray argues that because the Virginia drug possession 
statute under which he was convicted, see Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-250, contains a broader 
range of drugs than the federal controlled substance schedule, the statute is divisible, 
which means that the conviction cannot be used as a predicate § 851 enhancement, and 
that he is, therefore, actually innocent of the sentencing enhancement.  He purports to 
rely on Mathis, in which the Supreme Court stressed that, for purposes of applying the 
categorical (or modified categorical) approach, a statute is divisible only when it sets 
forth different elements delineating separate crimes, not when it sets forth different 
means of committing a single crime.  See 136 S. Ct. at 2253.   
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 We conclude that the District Court properly rejected the petition as it related to 
Murray’s “Mathis” claim, too.  We have not held that innocence-of-the-sentence claims 
fall within the exception to the rule that habeas claims must be brought in § 2255 
motions.  See, e.g., Gardner, 845 F.3d at 103.  And, in any event, Murray has not shown 
that Mathis constituted an intervening change in law which made available to him the 
argument that he presents here, that the Virginia list of controlled substances contains a 
broader range of drugs than the federal controlled substance schedule such that his 
Virginia conviction cannot be used as a predicate § 851 enhancement.  Murray could 
have, therefore, raised this argument in his initial § 2255 motion. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
